




HOW TO SELL A PICKUP TRUCK: "BEAT-OR-PAY"
ADVERTISEMENTS AS FACILITATING DEVICES
by Michael R. Baye and Dan Koveno~k~
~`- a ~~ ~
August 1990
lssrr o924-78i51
How to Scll a Piclaip Truck:
"Beat-or-Pay" Advertisements as Facilitating Devices `
Michael R. Baye
Texas ABtM University 8z CentER
Dan Kovenock
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 8z Purdue University
August 7, 1990
Abstract
This paper examines the profitability of running an advertisement that
prumixcx to pay da~nagex to fUxtOfller9 who can fiud a(xrrioux) prire oRcr
that the firm will not undercut. We show that such an advertisement can sup-
port a collusive price, and (urthermore, that no other firm has an incentive to
duplicate the advertisement. We also ahow Lhat, under plauaible conditiona,
such an advertisement can prevent entry into a market that would otherwise
be vulnerable to entry. Thc resulta are ahown to be relevant in areas Lhat span
several topics in the literature, including modcls of salea, brand loyalty, and
entry prevention.
' We thank Eric van Damme, Arthur Robson, and Monika Schnitzer for commenta on previous
drafta. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors.z
1 Introduction
'I'hix paper c~xamines thc~ prolitability of ruuniug an advertixcmcnt that promisca to
pa:v d:unaxcs tn c-nxtom~~rx who can tiud a(xrrionx) price o(I'~,r tha4 the firm will uot
uuJ~~rcut. Wi~ xhuw that xnc-h au :ulvortixi~mout cau xupport a c~ollnxivc price nnrl
allrart cc~usumc~rs frum tho uthrr lirm. I:urthc~rnwrc, iu equilibrium ouly onc lirw
will send such a message, as no other firm has an incentive to duplicate an existing
advertisement.
Most of the literature on price competition that allows advertising messages
presumes firms are restricted to a single type of advertising message. For instance,
Varian ( 1980) assumes that the only type of advertising message is to advertise a
price. Lin (1988), on the other hand, assumes the space of advertising messages con-
siats purely of a promise to match the price of rivals. An exception is Png-Hirshleifer
(1987), who consider both price and price matching advertisements. The preaent
paper difiers from the extant literaturc in two important respects. First, and as
noted above, we consider a type of advertising message not examined elsewhere in
the literature: "beat-or-pay" commitments. Secondly, we consider a space of adver-
tising messages that includes those considered by Varian, Lin, and Png-Hirahleifer.
Thus we are able to compare the viability of beat-or-pay advertisements with others
appearing in the literature, including price matching and price advertising. Among
other tliings, our analysis reveals that the equilibria of existing pricing games are
sensitive to the assumod structure and timing of advertising messages.
Before we present a formal model that incorporates beat-or-pay advertisements,
it is useful to describe the model in the context of the story that motivated it.
In a small town in Texas there are two rival pickup truck dealers, which we will
call Billy Bob and Bobby Joe. Consumers in the town view the two dealers (and
their products) as pertect substitutes. Each Sunday, Billy Bob and Bobbie Joe
run advertisements that list prices for new pickup trucks. I[owever, one Sunday
Ililly Bob deviated from this practice by running the advertisement reproduced in
F'igurc l.3
n~n~n~n~. ~n~ ~?~ n~nwn~~c~nrn~n~n~n~n
BOSSIER DODGE
WILL PAY YOU!
If Bossler Chrysler-Dodge-Jeep-Eagle doesn't sell yoe a 1989 car, truck or ~an lor less
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Figurc I: SOUffC: I~I'1fQf!-COIICgC SiQGOil F,ngle 'Cucsday, July 25, 1989, Page 10II.4
This paper seeks to determine why Billy Bob would choose to run such an add,
Bobby Joe's optimal response, and the impact on profits and consumer welfare ot
the resulting Nash equilibrium. We consider games with alternative assumptions
abont lho Liming of advertising and pricing decisions, aud conclude by relating our
results to thi~ existiug literature on brand loyalty and entry.
2 The Basic Model
For simplicity and without loss of generality, consider a market serviced by two
firms who produce at zero cost. In the market there are two types of consumers: (1)
uninformed consumers, who do not read the newspaper, and (2) informed consumers,
who do read the newspaper. There are 2U uninformed consumers and I informed
consurncrs. For simplicity, we assume consumers have a zero-one demand, such that
each consumer will purchase one unit of product if the price is less than or equal to
r, and zero units if the price is greater than the reservation price, r. Each firm sells
identical products, which we will refer to as pickups.
Since the uninformed consumers do not read the local newspaper, they go to
one of the dealers and purchase a pickup if the price is less than or equal to r. We
assume the uninformed consumers allocate themselves evenly among the two firms,
so that each dealer is guaranteed U- 2U~2 uninformed consumers, provided price is
set at or below r. The informed consumers, on the other hand, read the newspaper
and purchase from the dealer offering the most favorable deal.
'fhrce types o( advcrtisements are available. The first type is that assumed by
Varian (1980), where a firm advertises its price in the newspaper. We call such an
advorl.isomonl. a prirr (1'J mrssa~;~~. 'fho si,cimd typr, ~~r advortisiu~; mossa{;r~ is for a
linn to advortise a list prir~~ buL promise to match the price of any competitor. 5uch
an adv~~rtisement is termed a pricr rnatching (PM) message. '1'he third advertisiug
mossa~;o is a list prict~ aloug with Lhc fitatl`IIII`nt, "We will pay yon 51000 if we do
not scll you a new pickup [or less than any other authorized dealer.t" We will refer
'The exxt amount paid ia not important. O( course, [or such an add to not be exploitabk by5
to such an advertisement as a bent-or-pay (lJOP) message.~
Ily sending a P-ntessage, a firm commits to charging a single price to all con-
sumers. But by sending a PM or a BOP message, a firm can explicitly price discrim-
inate between informed and uninformed consumers. Specifically, PM's and BOP's
involve a list price (paid by the uniníormed) and a price ultimately paid by informed
consumers (those customers who know the firm is committed to either match or beat
the rival). Also note that PM's and BOP's are different from "meet-or-release,"
"most-favored-nation," and "best price" provisions that have been examined exten-
sively in the contracting literature; cf. Belton (1987), Holt and Scheffman (1987),
and Schnitzer (1990)3
A firm's strategy consists of the type of inessage sent and the particular price
offered at each information set~ The next three sections characterize the Nash
equilibrium strategies and profits under thrce diflerent assumptions about the timing
~~ouaumwa, 4hrre nwal Ir~ w,me cundiliona to prevunl atrxlrgic conxmnor b~haviur. Far exunple,
bedorc tbe 510110 will be paiJ, tbe conaumer must ( I) havc abown the dcalcr a pricc that hc refuaes
to undercul; anJ (2) return with proof of purchaae at thal price ( lhe pickup and LiUe, (or inatance).
We asaume auch is the caae.
~Other varianta o[ beat-or-psy advertiaementa are poasible. For example, Eric van Damme,
in private conversstion, hae noted lhat in the Netherlanda "kijkahops" offer paymente thal are a
function o[ the dil[erence in price. We do nol explore alternative atrategiea here. Indeed, one o[
the central pointa that emergea [rom the present analyais is thst many reaulta in the literature,
including lhoae of Vuian (1980) and Png and Hirahlei[er (1988), are not robuat with reapect to
changea in the spue of advertiaing messagea. Since this would appeaz to be a general reBUlt, our
[ocus on only three typea of advertising meesagea is not without laaa o[ generality.
~In the contracting literature, t meet-or-release clauae is a promiae by a seller to meet a lower
price of[ered to a customer, or to release the conaumer from the contract. A most-[avored-nation
clause ie a promiae that a cuatomer will receive the loweat price charged to any customer. Best-price
cl:uaea combine these two featuree.
~Thc diRcrence betwecn lhe preaenl model and lhe modcls of, for inatance, Varian ( 1980),
Lin( I'J88), and I'ug anJ Iliraldeifcr ( 1987), ia thal wc allow thc finux to ch`uu.e from among thrcc
dilCerenl typea oC poaaible advertiaing meeaagea. The etralegy apace o( advcrliaing mceaagea (with
some abuse of notation) conaidered in this paper is A-{ P, PM, DOP). Varian assumes the apace
o[ advertiaing measagea is simply {P}; Lin assumea the space of inessagea to be simply { PM}; Png
and HirshleiCer aesume the spue of inessagea is {P,PM}.6
of decisions. In each case, it will be seen that a firm sending a BOP-message does
v~ry wcll, in ~quilibrium.
3 Sitnultaneous Advertising - 5imultaneous Pricing
We first model firm behavior as a two-stage game of complete in[ormation. In
stage one, firms (simultaneously) commit to one of the three types of advertising
messages. This stage can be thought as the stage where the advertising department
of the newspaper begins working on the general layout of an advertisement. In the
second stage, firms set prices with knowledge of the first-stage decisions. One can
think of this as a last-minute decision just prior to sending the advertising message.
To solve for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium we use backwazd induction,
solving first for the equilibrium in each of the pricing subgames. There are a total
of nine subgames, but due to the symmetric nature of the game, only six of them
are distinct. These are analyzed in the subsection below. Given equilibrium payoffs
for the pricing subgames, we then determine the equilibrium first-stage advertising
decisions. This is done in subsection 3.2.
3.1 Equilibrium in the Pricing Subgames
The P-P Subgame
We first consider the subgame where the firms (simultaneously) submit an ad-
vertised price to the local newspaper. Each firm is assured of getting U unin(ormed
consumers, provided of course that their price is not set above the reservation price.
In addition, however, the firm setting the lowest price captures all of the informed
consumers. More formally, letting p; and p~ denote the prices of firms i and j(í ~ j),




P; (! ~ U] if p; G p~ and p; C r
0 otherwise7
It is known (cf. Varian (1980); Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries ( 1989)) that this
game has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Nowever, it does havea mixed-strategy
equilibrium,s whereby the two firms randomiae continuously on the interval (p', r],
where p' - rU~(I f U). The expected profits of the two firms are
Ex; - rU.
In essence, the potential rents írom informed consumers are competed away via
stochastic price undercutting. Profits are the same as would exist if there were
absolutely no informed consumers in the market6
The P-BOP Subgame
Next we examine the subgame where one firm advcrtises price and the other firm
sends a beat-or-pay message. Equilibrium in this subgame requires that the firm
sending the P-message charge a price of r, while the firm sending the BOP-message
lists a price of r and sells to intormed consumers at a price of r- c, where c is the
smallest unit of currency in the economy.~
To verify these claims, note that the informed consumers will ask the firm sending
the BOP-message to undercut any price charged by the other firm. Furthermore,
the firm sending the BOP-message has a strict incentive to undercut any such price
above 5-1000; doing otherwise would require a payment of 51000 to each informed
consumer. Consequently, the firm sending the P-message earns profits of pU for
advertising a price p~-1000, and profits of p(U } I) for advertising a price p C
-]000. 'Che firm sending the P-message clearly maximizes profits by setting p- r
to earn rU.
The best response of the firm sending a IlOP-message to any advertised price p is
to advertise a price r and undercut p for the informed consumers ifp~-1000. Since
Sln fact, for lhie two-firm game, the equilibrium ix symmetric and unique. When there are more
than two firma, there are scontinuum ofasymmetricequilibria, but a unique xymmetric equilibrium.
However, all o( lheee equilibria sre payo(f-equivalent; see Baye, Kovenock, and de Vriex (1989).
"In lhix raAP, firmx would fhargP lI1P monopoly pricP, r, and Parn rU.
rllPncPfurlh, wP xhall axxumc c ix arbitrarily xmall.8
the firm sending the P-message lists a price of r, the firm sending the BOP-message
thus earns rU f(r - c)I, which tends to r(U f I) as e tends to zero.
The P-PM Subgame
Next, consider the subgame where one firm sends a P-message and the other
firm sends a PM-message. Given the symmetric nature of the problem, we assume
without loss of generality that firm one sends the P-message and firm two sends the
I' M - m~h;sa~;~~.
In this subgame, il is c:wy to sir Ulat UIPfC dOCS not exist a N:vsh equilibrimn
in pure strategies. fiowever, letting F~ and Fz denote the cumulative distribution
functions used by firms one and two to randomize prices, and defining p- r[U~(If
U)]i, the Nash equilibrium mixed-strategies are given by
0 i(pGP
1 f~[1 - PJ if P E[p, r]
1 otherwise
0





To verify that this is a Nash equilibrium,8 note that the expected profit of firm
ono whcu it scts a pricc~ of p, givcn IZ, is
xi - Fz(P)PL~ t[1 - Fz(P)] ~U t 2J
P.
With probability Fz(p), firm twolllists a price below p, in which case firm one sells
only to the unin(ormed consumers at a price o( p. But with probability [1 - Fz(p)],
firm two lists a price above p. In this case, firm two ends up matcl~ing firm one's
price of p, and thus firm one sells not only to the U uninformed consumers, but !~2
informed consumers as well.
Similarly, the expected profit o( firm two when it sets a price of p, given Ft, is
"We omit the proof of uniqueneas.I ,.
xt - I'~~(P)P(I } z r zdF'i(z) t[i - F~i(P)][l~ f I]P. ( l)
Je
With probability F~(p), firm one lists a price below p. In thie instance, firm two
sells to U uninformed consumers a price of p, and matches firm one's price to sell
to one-half of the informed consumers. The probability of this event, times the
expected profits of selling to these later consumers are
F~(P)
[2IDx F~(P))] - f p zdFi(z),
e e
which accounts for the second term on the right-hand-side of equation 1. With
probability [1 - F~ (p)], firm two sets the lowest price, and servicea U f I consumers
at a price of p, which accounts for the last term in equation 1.
Substituting the asserted Nash equilibrium forms of Fl and F~ into the expres-
sions for expected profits reveals that
f !l f U l~
~~-rLU}2J ljfU1
and
xt - r[U(Il t l)]~ .
which is constant on [p, r]. Furthermore, for each i, a; is lower for p Q[p, r]. llence,
each firm's profits are maximal and constant on [p, r], given the (mixed) strategy of
the other firm, and thus Fl and FZ comprise the Nash equilibrium mixed strategies
of firms one and two.
The BOP-BOP Subgame
Informed consumers make out like bandits in the equilibrium of this subgame:
One firm pays each informed consumer á1000 for having failed to undercut thc rival's
"best" price, while the other firm sells each informed consumer a pickup for 5-1000
(i.e., it pays each informed consumer 51000 to take a pickup). The uninformed
consumers, on the other hand, purchase at the advertised price of r.
To see why, suppose each firm promises to pay 51000 (per informed consumer)
if it fails to undercut the rival. Clearly, each firm will choose to advertise a price of10
r. Let p~ be the "best" price obtained by a given informed consumer at firm j, after
an arbitrary round of undercutting. Given such a price, the optimal strategy oí firm
i is to undercut any p~ 1-1000. If p~ C-1000, firm i is better off refusing to beat
this price, and instead paying 51000 to the informed consumer.9 In equilibrium, one
firm therefore sells a pickup to a given informed consumer for 5-1000, while the
other firm pays the given consumer 51000 for failing to undercut the rival. Since
there are I iníormed consumers, each firm earns profits of rU - 10007.
The BOP-PM Subgame
This subgame has a continuum of Nash equilibria. In all of the equilibria, the
lirm s~,udiu(; 4he ROI'-mossage earns profitn uf rl! - 10001, whilo t.hc profil.s of the
firm sendiug the 1'M-mcssagc range from rU - 1000I to r[I~ U~. Interestingly, the
lirm si~uding Uu~ 1301'-mossage can dctonuiw~ Un~ profits of thc firm scndiug the
PM-message. As subsequent analysis will revcal, the firm sending the 130P-message
has xn iucentive to adopt a trigger strategy that credibly protnises to minimize the
payoffof the rival in the event this subgame is reached, in an attempt to induce the
rival to "avoid" this subgame. For this reason, we focus on the equilibrium where
the firm sending the BOP-message selects the equilibrium where the opponent's
payoff is minimized.
'1'o vcrify these assertions, note that the firm sending the BOP-message will un-
dercut (when asked to do so by an informed consumer) any price above 3-1000;
doing otherwise would require a á1000 payment to the consumer. IIut the firm send-
ing the PM-message is obligated to match any such price. Intuitively, an informed
consumer has an incentive to "go back and forth" between the two firms, getting
successively lower or matched prices, until the firm sending the BOP-message fails
to further undercut price. Equilibrium therefore requires that each firm advertise
a prict~ of r, which is pa.id by th~~ uninforuud ronsumers. The infortnod consurners
then have an incentive to get a yuote from thc (inn sending thc 1'M-messagc, aud
vWe are, o( course, asauming lhat i( firma continue beating pricea that are even lower than
5-1000, lhc proceae ultimalcly lcrminalea at even lower levcl profita.11
taking Uie quote to the firm sending U~e BOP-message to obtain a lower price. The
firm sending the BOP-message is indifferent between refusing to undercut the price
charged by the rival, and undercutting, for each case ultimately results in prof-
its of rU - 1000l. Ifowever, if the firm pursucx the strategy of undercutting any
price abovc ~-1000, it reduccs tbe pro(its uf lhe linn sending the NM-messagc to
rU - 1000l.
The PM-PM Subgame
The final subgame to be examined is the one where each firm advertises a price
and promises to match any lower price charged by a competitor. In this subgame,
the profit to firm i when it lists a price o( p; G r and firm j charges p~ C r is
x; -
( Pt(U -}- 1~2) if p; ~ p~
P;U t p~I~2 if p; ~ p~
Since this expression is increasing in p; for any p„firm i's best response to any p~
is tu s~~t p; - r. Ileuc~~, oach (inn will IisL a prire of r in equilibrium and the informed
allorato tbomselvcs evrnly arross firms. I:aeli firm carns profitx of r[(~ f!~2].
3.2 Equilibrium Advertising Strategies
Civen the payoffs computed xhove for each of the pricing subgames, we now solve for
the first-stage advertising decisions. The "reduced" normal form for the advertising
game is presented in Table 1. Note that the entries correspond with the equilibrium
profits derived for each of the subgames.
It is clear from Table 1 that (a) the best response to a P-message is a BOP-
message; (b) the best response to a BOP-message is a P-message; and (c) the best
response to a 1'M-mcssage is a NM-mcssage. It follows that, for U,! 1 0 the game
has two types of subgame perfect Nash equilibria: Either each firm sends a PM-
messagc, or one firm sends a BOP-message and tbe other sends a P-message. Note
Uiat ~ofal profits am c~qual in all Nash equilibria. But importantly, in the BOY-}'
uqnilibrium, tbc tirm soudiug the I101'-mexsage makes the IIIgIICBt I)OxKll)IC payo(f.12
1' DOP PM
P rU, rU rU, r[I t U] r[U t z][~]~, r[U(U t 1)]I'
BOP r[I t U], rU rU - 10001, rU -]0001 rU - ]0001, rU - ]0007
PM r[C~ t 3][7~p]~.r[U(U t I)]~ rU - 10001, rU - ]0001 r(U t!~2], r[U t l~2]
Table 1: Payoff Malrix tor Alternative Advertising Choices
While 16i~ firms do well iu all equilibria (espocially the firm sending a IIOP-
m~~ssal;o), cuusnmors farc puorly. lu all equilibria, infunned aud wiinfonucd con-
sumers alike pay a price of r, which is the monopoly price. In the absence of PM
and BOP-messages, the model reduces to that o( Varian, in which case informed
and uninformed consumets pay )ess than r with probability one. The availability of
PM and BOP advertising messages thus reduces consumer welfare.
lt is instructive to consider the importance of the presence of informed and unin-
formed consumers. When all consumers are uninformed (I - 0) the payoffs in each
cell of the matrix are identical (and equal to rU). In this instance, any permutation
of the three advertising strategies comprises a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Each firm essentially acts as an independent monopolist. In contrast, when all of the
consumets are informed (U - 0), there are again two types of subgame perfect Nash
equilibria: Either each firm sends a PM-message, or one firm sends a BOP-message
and the other sends a P-message. The presence of informed consumers thus implies
that the structure of the space of advertising messages matters, in equilibrium.
4 Sequential Advertising - Simultaneous Pricing
Supposc wc alter sligVdly Lhc timíng of the advertising decisions. In particu)ar,
suppose firm one can commit to a particular type of advertising message before
firm two. Civen kuowledgc of finn one's dccision, finn two then detennines its
advertising decision. Finally, given knowledge of these two moves, the two firms13
simultanmusly set prices. This three-stage game can be solved by backwards induc-
tion, and importantly, the final stage (containing the pricing subgames) is identical
to that examined in the previous section. Hence all that is required to analyze this
situation is to view player one as a"Stackelberg" player with respect to advertising,
given the payoff matrix in Table 1.
It follows from Table 1 that the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for
this three-stage game is for firm one to send a BOP-message, firm two to send a
P-mcssage, and for cach Grm to advertise a price of r. In equilibrium, the firm
scuding the beat-or-pay nxssage eanis profits of r[U -} I], while the firm choosiug
Lo adw,rtis~~ prico oarns profits of rf~. "I'his ~~xplaius wby 14illy 11ob found it in his
iut~~rost lu plac~~ t6~, add.
5 BOP-Messages and Entry
The structure of the game considered here difl'ers from the two above in several
respects. First, we assume firm one (best thought of here as the incumbent) commits
to an advertising and pricing decision before firm two. Given knowledge of this,
firm two (the potential entrant) decides whether to enter, and if so, its advertising
and pricing strategy. Secondly, instead of partitioning consumers into informed
and uninformed, suppose that of the N- L t S consumers, L ~ 0 of them are
loyal to firm one, but none of the consumers are loya] to firm two. Loyalty, in this
context, means that consumers have a strict preference for the incumbent's product,
irrespective of the price charged by the rival.tu Ilowever, suppose S consumers will
bu,y from Lh~, firm si~lling at th~~ lowost pria~. "I'hrsc consumcre r.tn be thought of ab
"switchers." As before, each firm can produce at zero cost, and consumers have a
msorvation pricc uf r. Wt~ will show lhat tbr snbl;amo perfort N:tsh oquilibrium for
this game is for (irm one to send a UOY-message and list a pricc of r, so that Jirm
two gets none of the market.
Suppose the incumbent simply advertises a price. Since firm two has no loyal
~"The interested reader ehould compare this with Narasimhan (1988).14
customers, it will enter and undercut any positive price.~~ Ifence, firm one will
never make profits on the S consumers, and thus finds it in its interest to set price
at r. Firm two chooses to enter and c undercuts firm one to earn profits of rS.t~
Interestingly, i[ S~ L, the entrant earns higher profits than the incumbent.
In contrast, suppose the incumbent chooses to advertise a price o[ r, and sends
a PM-message. In this case the subgame perfect best response of the potential
entrant is to enter and charge a price of r to get S~2 consumers. In this instance,
equilibrium profits for the incumbent are r[L -} S~2] and tor the entrant are rS~2.
'I'br prtssibility of sonding a PM-mossagr~ euhanres tbo profit of the incurnbont at
tlie oxpi~utic u( Llie putontial outrant.
In evon sharpe~r coutratit., suppose lhe inrumbout advc~rtises a price of r, aud
sends a 1i01'-message. In this case tbe poteutial cntraut lias no incentive toenter the
market, since the incumbent has committed to undercut any price above 3-1000.ta
In this case, Nash equilibrium profits of the incumbent are r[L t SJ, while the
potential entrant stays out and earns 0.
The above results imply that, when an incumbent is free to choose among P,
PM, and BOP advertising messages, and there are some customers loyal to the
incumbent, the incumbent can prevent entry by charging the monopoly price while
promising to pay damages in the event he fails to undercut any offer. In this context,
IIOP advertising messages serve as a barricr to entry.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has examined the profitability of following an advertising strategy of
promising to pay damages to customers who can find a price offer the firm will not
~~~'hix involvex ríther aetling pz an r (xmall) bclow pi, or lixting q~ p, xnd xending a 130P-
meswage.
1zThie ia similar to resulte in Farrell and Shapiro ( ]986) and Deneckere, Kovenock, and Lee
(1988 ).
r~0[course, since the entrant earna zero regardlesa of whether he enters, he ie indiBerent between
entering and not entering. If there ia a(po~enibly amall) entry coet, the entraM haa a etrict incentive
nol lo eoter.15
undercut. We have shown that, when firms have the option of using one of three
advertising strategies - a standard price advertisement, a price-matching advertise-
ment, or a beat-or-pay advertisement - the beat-or-pay advertisement should be
adopted by any firm having the opportunity to preempt its rival. Furthermore, it is
a Nash equilibrium strategy for one firm to utilize such a strategy even when firms
simultaneously determine advertising strategies. In each case, the use of beat-or-pay
advertisements allows a firm to enjoy higher profits than its rival, in equilibrium.
TLe generality and robustness of the results reported here are a matter of per-
spective. On the one hand, we have demonstrated that certain advertising strategies
deemed profitable in the literature are much Iess profitable in the (ace of simple and
easily implementable (i.e., "any Billy Bob can do it") counter strategies. In plau-
sible instances, a simple price advertising strategy (Varian (1980)) or price match-
ing strategy (Png-Hirshleifcr (1~J87)) yields finns lower profits thau a beat-or-pay
strategy. líence, models o( pricing which ignore advertising choice do not accurately
relloct the mlative ease with which real-world (inns can extract reuts from customers
(and othcr lirms, i( fomsighted cnough to prcrmpt).
On the utber luind, thcrc is a tnulLitude~ of other potential advertising messages
which have not been analyzed, some ot which may perform as well as or better than
boat-or-pay rnessages. Reeause of the richness of the set of inessages Lhat real-world
(inns can convey in advertising, au in-depth analysis of other messages is beyond
the scope of this paper. What is evident from the present analysis is that euisting
resulLs by, for example, Varian and Png-Ilirshlci(cr, are sensitive to thc assumed
Lyp~~ a.ud tiwiug uf a.dw~rl.isinl; uioss~ig~~s. It is also evidout why som~rmo likc llilly
Bob would run a bcat-or-pay advertisement.16
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